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Abstract
The first decade of the twenty-first century in Japan gives an insight into the politics 
of language.　Neoliberalism, which gives primacy to the flexibility in labor, weakened 
human ties among individuals.　This resulted in the fragmentation of Japanese society, 
and the state was driven to enhance social cohesion to reinforce the base of 
sovereignty.　In order to create social cohesion and subsume it under the state, the 
Japanese language was used as a system to develop a sense of unity in the present and as 
a history to strengthen the sense of unity along the passage of time.　However, the strate-
gic use of the Japanese language may lead to a further disintegration of society, because 
it may reproduce existing social inequality.　By taking Japan as an example, therefore, I 
wil consider implications for the politics of language for the next decade in the twenty-first 
century.
The Politics of the Japanese Language
When we look back at the history of Japan in and after the 1990s, it is characterized 
by a contradiction in which Japan tried to adapt itself to the context of global interdepend-
ence by folowing global trends on the one hand, but it adhered to specificity by re-organ-
izing the national on the other.　This contradiction is a characteristic of modernity, and 
the adherence to specificity could be understood as an interplay between the nation and 
the state.　Globalization as a consequence of modernity left out social relations from par-
ticular localities, and social relations are exposed to global social networks, most of which 
is formed by invisible others (Giddens, 1990, 1991).　Moreover, neoliberalism, which is 
another product of modernity, weakened human ties within the nation by throwing them 
into the chaotic situation in which labor conditions changed rapidly before they had ties 
with others.　This resulted in the fragmentation of Japanese society, shaking the founda-
tion of the nation-state’s sovereignty.　The nation-state is a system of government which 
resides in the complex that the nation-state forms with other nation-states in order to 
mutualy acknowledge sovereignty over the territory within the borders (Giddens, 1985), 
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and is often seen as requiring that politics and ethnicity share the borders (Smith, 
1995).　However, owing to the dynamism of modernity, “state and nation are at each 
other’s throats, and the hyphen that links them is now less an icon of conjuncture than an 
index of disjuncture” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 39).　The state then needs to raise a sense of 
belonging in the nation to reinforce the base of its sovereignty.
In order to create social cohesion within the nation and subsume it under the state, 
the Japanese language was used as a system to arouse a sense of unity in the present and 
as a history to strengthen the sense of unity along the passage of time (Yasuda, 
2006).　In other words, the systematic and historical aspects of the Japanese language 
provided atomized individuals with an anchorage in which they could have ties with oth-
ers by developing identity as members of Japanese society.　However, this nationalist 
movement may lead to isolation from the international society and paradoxical disintegra-
tion of Japanese society.　The strategic use of the Japanese language is based on a made-
up purity which may work as an obstacle to turning people’s eyes to the diversity of 
language in the world, and may try to transform social problems inherent in the structure 
of Japanese society into individuals’ psychological problems (Morris-Suzuki, 
2002).　Overlooking these ideological aspects of the Japanese language may lead to 
reproducing social inequality inherent in Japanese society in the 21st century, and by 
extension, making it difficult for Japan to globalize itself.
In this paper, therefore, I analyze the Japanese-language discourses1 to examine how 
the Japanese language is used to foster a sense of unity in the contemporary form of 
globalization.　To this end, I wil first look into the dynamism of modernity, and discuss 
what kinds of influences it has on Japanese society.　I wil then attend to how the 
Japanese language has to do with social concerns caused by modernity, and wil reveal 
the way in which the Japanese language is used to arouse a sense of unity in the 
nation.　Finaly, analyzing formal properties of Japanese-language discourses, I wil con-
sider implications for the politics of language in the 21st century.
The Dynamism of Modernity
One of the paradoxes in the era of globalization, which brings up the image of inter-
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connectedness of al the states, is the intensification of nationalism al over the world 
(Hobsbawm, 1990; Smith, 1991).　According to Giddens (1999), “[g]lobalization not only 
puls upwards but also pushes downwards, creating new pressures for local autonomy” (p. 
31).　Globalization’s pressure acted on Japan’s autonomy, and resulted in a series of 
nationalist movements from the top-down perspectives through the enhancement of a 
legal structure to protect Japan’s autonomy to the botom-up perspectives.　In 1999, for 
example, the National Flag and National Anthem Law was passed in the Diet, and in 2000, 
the then Prime Minister said at a political meeting that Japan was god’s country with the 
emperor as the central figure.　Nationalism was manifested in the academic field and at 
the grass-roots level as wel.　Many conservative intelectuals, through their publications, 
tried to re-examine and partialy justify Japan’s imperialism and colonialism during the 
Second World War.　Around the turn of the century, the sales of the Japanese-language-
related books picked up quite a bit to the extent that some of them sold more than milion 
copies.　Komori (2002) saw the Japanese-language boom as an early sign of botom-up 
nationalism, because the Japanese language gave a firm foothold for identity to those who 
had ascribed Japan’s economic prosperity to the uniqueness of the Japanese but were 
deprived of the means to identify themselves in the midst of recession.　These move-
ments could be seen as an interplay between the ruling classes and masses in Japan over 
the turn of the century in the sense that the former used nationalism as a means to unify 
Japan as a nation-state, and the later used nationalism to construct identity.　As I wil dis-
cuss below, Japanese-language discourses, through which the state tried to arouse a 
sense of unity in the nation, took the same line as these nationalist movements.
A possible answer to this contradictory process is the dynamism of modernity. 
Giddens (1990, 1991) sees globalization as the expansion of modernity on a global scale, 
and views the re-organization of time and space as a distinctive character of modernity. 
In pre-modern cultures, according to Giddens, time was always connected with 
space.　Yet modernity separated time from specific places through the uniformity of time 
measurement by the mechanical clock, and this emptying of time worked as the pre-con-
dition for the emptying of space.　Social networks were then lifted out of particular locali-
ties, and exposed to infinite space.　As Giddens (1991) says, therefore, “Globalization 
concerns the interaction of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and 
social relations ‘at distance’ with local contextualities” (p. 21).　In the same vein, Harvey 
(1989) cals this spatial-temporal transformation “time-space compression” (p. 240), 
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explaining the reason as folows:
I use the word ‘compression’ because a strong case can be made that the history of 
capitalism has been characterized by speed-up in the pace of life, while so overcom-
ing spatial barriers that the world sometimes seems to colapse inwards upon us 
(p. 240).
Giddens and Harvey suggest that the foundation of our life is being rapidly changed by 
the power of the invisible that was aroused by the re-organization of time and space.
Bauman (2000) cals the current stage of modernity ‘liquid modernity’, in which 
social conditions for people’s actions change before their actions change into habits, as if 
natural conditions constantly change before a liquid changes into a solid (Bauman, 
2005).　Among other things, the paterns and frames of interdependence to circumscribe 
individuals’ social actions are founded anew by liquid modernity’s melting power before 
anything else (Bauman, 2000).　In liquid modernity, therefore, the framework for iden-
tity is rapidly changing before individuals build up their identity (Bauman, 2001).
Neoliberalism, which is a theory of political economic practices, shows such charac-
teristics of modernity.　I see neoliberalism as the immediate source of the fragmentation 
of Japanese society, and the prevalence of neoliberalism in the world has to do with what 
Giddens (1990, 1991) cals modernity’s reflexivity, which refers to the idea that newly 
acquired knowledge or information on aspects of society (re)structures, or under certain 
circumstances, transforms the social aspects.　This quality of modernity thus causes a 
break between the past and the present.
Neoliberalism made a break with an economic doctrine that had been practiced in 
many places of the world.　The world after the Second World War was characterized by 
the economic policy caled Keynesianism, in which many states put industrial policy 
under their control and maintained their influence on standards for social wages through 
the construction of welfare systems, and Keynesianism achieved a moderate success 
(Harvey, 2005).　As economic growth colapsed and low dividends became the norm in 
the 1970s, however, an alternative to Keynesianism was sought by the upper classes, 
because it became clear that the Keynesianism would not give profit to them.　By an 
experiment with neoliberalism in Chile in 1973, it became common knowledge that the 
alternative to Keynesianism gave more financial advantage to the upper classes under pri-
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vatization, and the upper classes then began to introduce neoliberalism into their coun-
tries (Harvey, 2005).　Modernity’s reflexivity accelerated the change of economic policy 
in the world, and one of the consequences was the uneven distribution of wealth and 
power on a global scale.
The history of neoliberalism in Japan ilustrates Harvey’s (2005) views of 
neoliberalism.　In the 1980s, Japan was lagging far behind superpowers such as the UK 
and US in response to neoliberalism, because at that time, Japan rejoiced in an unprece-
dented economic development in its history.　As Japan lost its competitiveness in the 
world market early in the 1990s, however, the ruling classes of Japanese society became 
aware of the need for neoliberalism (Watanabe, 2001).　When we survey the history of 
neoliberalism in Japan from the 1990s to the middle of 2000s, therefore, a list of policies 
for relaxation of restraints can be drawn up.2
This structural reform had a harmful influence on Japanese society in terms of dis-
parities in income, local administration, and education.　The investigation of income dis-
tribution for the 2002 fiscal year revealed that people in the upper brackets, who 
comprised 25 percent of the total population, accounted for 75 percent of the gross 
national income (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2006).　Regional disparities 
also confronted a grave situation, and disparities between center and periphery or 
between urban or rural areas widened during the past 25 to 30 years in terms of unem-
ployment rate, the effective opening-to-application ratio, and prefectural income 
(Tachibanaki, 2006).　Disparities in these two areas might threaten equal educational 
opportunities, because the percentage of students enroling in prestigious universities 
depends on parents’ annual income.　It should be noted, furthermore, that disparities in 
education may result in a vicious circle in which disparities in income are reproduced by 
the unequal educational opportunities.
The fragmentation of society means the loss of human ties, which leads to entailing 
anxiety (Bauman, 2000).　According to Giddens (1985, 1991), when what he cals ‘onto-
logical security’ is threatened, people feel anxiety about their identity.　Ontological secu-
rity refers to a sense of security through which people can have a feeling of their lasting 
existence, and this is brought by everyday routine (Giddens, 1985, 1991).　When people 
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are able to define themselves in daily interactions with others, they do not have anxiety in 
regards to identity.　In liquid modernity in which social conditions change constantly 
before they have ties with others, however, it gets difficult to form a sense of self as a 
member of the society (Giddens, 1991).
Japan demonstrates this point.　According to the 2007 White Paper on National Life 
(Cabinet Office, 2007a), neoliberalism and relaxation of restraints had the effect of weak-
ening ties with others.　It was thus feared that the breakdown of human ties had a nega-
tive influence on society, and the ways to rebuild ties with others were sought (Cabinet 
Office, 2007a).　As a mater of fact, Kokumin seikatsu ni kansuru seron chosa (A public-
opinion pol about people’s lives in Japan) (Cabinet Office, 2007b) announced that those 
who felt distress and anxiety in daily life accounted for 67.6 percent of 5,941 participants 
which was the highest number ever registered since 1958.
Frightened individuals then try to lessen their anxiety, searching human ties with 
others.　As Bauman (2000) says metaphoricaly, therefore, “There is…demand for indi-
vidual pegs on which frightened individuals could hang colectively, if only for a brief 
time, their individual fears” (p. 38).　The search for identity and human ties can be under-
stood as the emergence of nationalism, since this psychological phenomenon reveals 
itself when social and political ties are weakened (Hobsbawm, 1990).　As Smith (1991) 
says, furthermore, “It is through a shared, unique culture that we are enabled to know 
‘who we are’ in the contemporary world” (p. 17).　Nationalism has to do with the poten-
tial to develop an affinity for the symbols that stress a commonality between those who 
set up a political system (Giddens, 1985).　It folows that nationalism by definition keep 
 ‘Them’ out of sight (Hobsbawm, 1990).　Language then plays a crucial role in the nature 
of nationalism, because by teling history, myth, and tradition, it provides members of a 
society with the blueprint of what they should be like as members of an ethnic group 
(Smith, 1991).　The Japanese-language boom, which is mentioned above, may be a good 
example.　As Giddens (1985) says, the fact that its existence precedes any generation of 
the community makes language a firm footing for the members of the ethnic 
community.　Language thus gives those who feel anxiety about identity a footing for the 
re-construction of identity.
Given the discussion above, it can be observed that the fluid social conditions cre-
ated by modernity provided Japan with an opportunity to re-structure its base as a nation-
state through the Japanese language.　In the present, every country is a nation-state 
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(Giddens, 2001), which refers to the political apparatus that monopolizes administration 
of the territory within clearly defined boundaries (Giddens, 1985; Held, 1995).　The 
nation-state’s governance is approved by law as wel as the direct control of violence, and 
the later is made possible by internal suppression (Giddens, 1985; Held, 1995).　More 
importantly, the validity of the nation-state, which is vested with such power, depends on 
how much loyalty the state can command in the nation (Held, 1995).　If Japan succeeds 
in arousing a sense of unity in the nation by molding it into a particular ethnic identity 
through the strategic use of the Japanese language, this gives Japan a solid foundation, 
which can meet demands from the political economy of globalization that require every 
nation-state to work as a colective corporation (Harvey, 2005).
Method
I wil analyze Japanese-language discourses to reveal the way in which Japanese-
language discourses try to arouse a sense of unity in the nation through particular ways 
of using words.　Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) meets this methodological 
requirement.　According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), “CDA sees discourse – lan-
guage use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’” (p. 258).　In other words, 
CDA holds that discourses shape and are shaped by society, atending to the impact that 
formal properties of discourses have on society (Fairclough, 2001, 2003).　CDA consid-
ers that “discourse may…try to pass off assumptions (often falsifying ones) about any 
aspect of social life as mere common sense” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 
258).　Ideology-laden ways of using language, which underpin falsifying assumptions and 
represent these as truth, are often invisible.　Through linguistic analyses of discourses, 
therefore, “CDA aims to make more visible these opaque aspects of discourse” 
(Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258), and tries to reveal the ways in which formal proper-
ties of discourses work on society.　By using CDA, therefore, I wil conduct a linguistic 
analysis of how Japanese-language discourses try to arouse a sense of unity in the 
nation.　I wil particularly atend to the discursive construction of the Japanese language 
as a system, and of the Japanese language as a history.
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Japanese-Language Discourses for National Unification
According to Anderson (2006), successful revolutionaries inherit the wiring of the 
old state such as dossiers, archives, and laws as if it was the electrical system that gives 
energy to a resident by the name of the state.　Yasuda (2006) atends to the fact that the 
wiring of the state is made up of writen language, and sees the Japanese language as an 
electrical system to control the Japanese society.　He suggests that a language built up 
as an electrical system has the aspect as a system and the aspect as a history.　As seen in 
files, treaties, and memoranda, language as a system has a synchronic function to control 
society.　At the same time, however, a specific language that passes through the system 
as electricity has diachronic characters which could not be dismissed as a simple system 
(e.g. culture, ethnicity, and identity).　Using the Japanese language discourses in strate-
gic ways, therefore, the ruling classes could foster a sense of synchronic unity through 
the Japanese language as a system, and a sense of diachronic unity through the Japanese 
language as a history.　To put it differently, just as an X coordinate and a Y coordinate 
determine the position of a point on coordinates, the synchronic and diachronic aspects of 
the Japanese language tel the Japanese where they are in fluid social conditions. 
Through the analysis of formal properties of Japanese-language discourses, I wil reveal 
the ways in which the Japanese language as a system and the Japanese language as a his-
tory are discursively constructed.
The Japanese Language as a System: Love of Home and Love of Country3
Folowing Anderson (2006) and Yasuda (2006), I see Japanese-language discourses 
as an electrical system to develop an imagined community in the present (Yasuda, 
2006).　I atend particularly to the juxtaposition of love of home and love of country as an 
example of the Japanese language as a system.
In the 165th extraordinary session of the Diet on 15 December 2006, the new 
Fundamental Law of Education was passed, and it was promulgated and enforced on 22 
December 2006.　What gave rise to the discussion in those days was that loving Japan 
and students’ home should be included as an objective in the new law.
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To foster an atitude to respect our tradition and culture, love the country and region 
that nurtured them, together with respect for other countries and a desire to contrib-
ute to world peace and the development of the international community.
Students’ performance at schools are thus assessed in terms of how much they love or 
show interest in the history, tradition, culture, and great figures of Japan (Ministry of Edu-
cation, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology [MEXT], n.d.).
The then Prime Minister was particularly enthusiastic for incorporating a description 
of the nurture of love of home and love of country into the new Fundamental Law of 
Education.
It is necessary to nurture love of home in the sense of education…in order that the 
young may have a sense of love of the country in which they were born and 
raised.　A sense of belonging to the country should folow as an extension of it [love 
of home] (Abe, 2006, p. 91 [translated by the author from the Japanese original]).
Cultivating love toward students’ home and Japan in students had been tried before 
these nationalist movements.　In Kokoro no Note (a notebook for moral education) for 
lower secondary schools, which was distributed to al elementary and lower secondary 
schools as a supplementary material in April 2002, students are asked to think of beautiful 
points for their home and what they can do for their home, under the heading “There are 
familiar sights, sounds, and faces here” that is designed to arouse nostalgia.　This is fol-
lowed by the section on love of country whose heading is “Love our country and wish for 
its prosperity”, and this section includes the folowing.
Extending love of home a litle further leads to a sense of loving Japan.　The sense 
of loving the country in which we live and wishing for its prosperity is quite natural… 
it is time we properly learn about Japan and gain a new understanding of its excelent 
tradition and culture…　Loving this country leads to loving the world (MEXT, 2002, 
p. 114 [translated by the author from the Japanese original]).
As these examples show, love of home and love of country were a primary concern in the 
Japanese-language discourses as a system.
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What is striking is that love of home and love of country are juxtaposed in these dis-
courses as if they were the one and the same.　However, Hobsbawm (1990) distin-
guishes between these two types of love.　Nationalism referred to an atachment to one’s 
homeland in the 19th century, and it was in a directly opposite position to the state.　Yet 
ruling classes in the state tried to transform nationalism into an atachment to the state 
out of recognition that nationalism gave great strength to the state if ruling classes could 
win it to the state’s side.　Interestingly, “ This…was often possible, by the mere projec-
tion of the sentiments of genuine, existential, identification with one’s ‘litle’ homeland on 
to the big one” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 90).
According to Fairclough (2001), consequential relationship between two or more ele-
ments, which is taken for granted, is ideologicaly constructed common sense.　In the 
above discourses, by juxtaposing ‘home’ and ‘country’ by the logical connector ‘and’, 
‘home and country’ implicitly means ‘home = country’, and ‘love of home and love of coun-
try’ means ‘love of home = love of country’ (Fairclough, 2001).　In other words, through 
the repetition of key words that are used as synonyms, continuity is established between 
the words (Woodside-Jiron, 2004).　By this discursive strategy, individuals’ diverse 
atachment toward their home is transformed into monolithic love toward the country.
The Japanese Language as a System: A Linguistic Hierarchy and Hybridism
The Japanese-language discourses as a system contribute to achieving national unifi-
cation by teling people that they are the speakers of a wonderful language which has 
both uniqueness and universality.
In The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Beter Governance in the New 
Milennium (Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century [PMC], 
2000), the Japanese language is represented as folows:
Lest there be any misunderstanding, we stress that Japanese is a wonderful lan-
guage…　If we treasure the Japanese language and culture, we should actively 
assimilate other languages and cultures, enriching Japanese culture through contact 
with other cultures and showing other countries the atraction of Japanese culture by 
introducing it in an appropriate fashion in their language (p. 20).
As can be seen in “Japanese is a wonderful language”, the Japanese language is repre-
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sented in an evaluative way.　According to Fairclough (2003), “Direct evaluative state-
ments can be seen as presupposed” (p. 179).　What is presupposed in this representation 
is a linguistic hierarchy.　The report presupposes that there are wonderful languages on 
the one hand and less wonderful languages on the other, since “a wonderful language” is 
“a discourse-relative evaluative expression” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 179).　By conceptualy 
categorizing languages, the superiority of the Japanese language is implied in this report.
In the last sentence, this report recommends that the Japanese language be treas-
ured by assimilating other languages into it.　In other words, it argues the need for the 
Japanese language as a hybrid language.　I regard this argument as a form of 
interdiscursivity.　According to Fairclough (1992), “different discourses combine under 
particular social conditions to produce a new, complex discourse” (p. 4).　It is a dis-
course of Nihonjinron (theories of Japaneseness) that combines with the above 
argument.　According to Iwabuchi (2001), since the 1990s, the ability to assimilate differ-
ent cultures into Japanese culture has been seen as a distinctive Japanese identity in a dis-
course of Nihonjinron.　Iwabuchi cals this strategic use of hybridity ‘hybridism’, and 
concludes that the main interest of those who advocated hybridism as a civilization was to 
present Japanese-style civilization to the world as universal.　The last sentence suggests 
that a discourse of Nihonjinron combine with a discourse of the Japanese language under 
the social condition in which national unification is needed for global competitiveness.
Just as the discourse of hybridism to establish Japan’s national identity can be atrib-
uted to a request of modern projects to create Japan as a distinctive nation-state in inter-
national exchange and cultural heterogeneity at the international level (Iwabuchi, 2001), 
the issue of introducing the Japanese language as a hybrid language to the world could 
be understood as a political project in which on the one hand, the universality of the 
Japanese language is ensured by stressing the existence of other languages’ elements in 
it, but on the other, uniqueness of the Japanese language is guaranteed by seeing the abil-
ity of appropriating other languages’ elements for it as peculiar to Japan.　As a conse-
quence, Japanese people could use the uniqueness and universality of the Japanese 
language to strengthen their identity as the speakers of this wonderful language.
The Japanese Language as a History: A Historical Flow of the Japanese Language
As long as electricity that passes through the electrical system is a particular lan-
guage, it has a history which cannot be dismissed as a simple system (Yasuda, 
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2006).　Japanese-language discourses use the long history of the Japanese language to 
locate Japanese people in the flux of time.
In Korekara no jidai ni motomerareru kokugoryoku ni tsuite (Concerning the Japanese 
Language Abilities Required for the Future Age),4 there are passages which represent the 
Japanese language in terms of the flux of time.　For example, the folowing traces the his-
tory of the Japanese language, and explains that it owes much to the forefathers’ 
knowledge.
The Japanese language is formed through its long history, and it is the basis of our 
country’s culture.　Or it is culture in itself.　Our forefather’s emotions such as sor-
row, pain, and joy are accumulated in each word of the Japanese language.　It is 
essential for understanding and taking over the traditional culture that our forefa-
thers created and for developing a new culture (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2004, p. 
3 [translated by the author from the Japanese original]).
The folowing emphasizes the need for taking over the legacy embedded in the Japanese 
language as a prescription for problems in the present.　In addition, the folowing dis-
cusses what the Japanese language education should be like in the present.
Furthermore, it is a critical issue that the decay of morals that has been seen in Japa-
nese society in recent years can be atributed to the lack of abilities to understand 
the sensitivity and emotion that we have as human beings…　These abilities are not 
naturaly acquired but learned mainly through Japanese language education.　The 
main purpose of Japanese language education is to steadily cultivate the emotional 
abilities, and by doing so, to enhance cultivation and foster a broad perspective 
(Council for Cultural Affairs, 2004, p. 5 [translated by the author from the Japanese 
original]).
As the title “Concerning the Japanese Language Abilities Required for the Future Age” 
shows, furthermore, this report discusses what the Japanese language should be like in 
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the future.　This report implies a long uninterrupted history of the Japanese language.
According to Wodak, de Cilia, Reisigl, and Liebhart (1999), “the discursive construc-
tion of national identity revolves around the three temporal axes of the past, the present, 
and the future” (p. 26).　In a similar vein, Smith (1986) says that individuals’ feeling of 
meaninglessness could be overcome by linking them to “persisting communities whose 
generations form indissoluble links in a chain of memories and identities” (p. 176).　In 
order to integrate atomized individuals in the present, one of the best ways might be to 
link them to a historical chain of the Japanese language.　Individuals could then have a 
sense of unity through the shared language, its history, and its memories.
The Goodness of the Japanese Language
There is no room for doubt that language is closely bound up with nationalism.　A 
particular language is especialy important as a medium for linking with the good old 
days, authenticity, and the distinction between Us and Them, each of which is considered 
a constituent of national cohesion (Hobsbawm, 1990).　The Japanese language is no 
exception in this respect.　However, why a particular language contributes to creating 
national unification is not fuly explicated.　Anderson’s (1998) idea of ‘the Goodness of 
nations’ gives an insight into this question.
In a journal interview whose main topic is a territorial issue of Japan, the former 
Prime Minister Abe talked about what constitutes Japan as a state.
When we think of ‘Japan’ as a state, we find that it includes those who live in Japan, 
those who lived in Japan, and those who wil be born in Japan (Yamamoto, 2007, p. 
89 [translated by the author from the Japanese original]).
In Abe’s view, the past, present, and future Japanese people constitute Japan as a state.
Abe talked about the unborn and the dead in this interview, but he did not describe 
their features.　As Anderson (1998) says, therefore, “ They have no special lineament at 
al” (p. 362).　The fact that the unborn are not born yet leads them to being conceptual-
ized as a totaly innocent nation, and by disregarding the behavior and social background 
of the dead during their lifetime, whether they were right or wrong, the dead are 
purified.　In other words, both the unborn and the dead have purity bereft of every social 
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characteristic.　Anderson (1998) cals this purity “monochrome purity” (p. 362), and says 
that monochrome purity guarantees the Goodness of nations.　The purified unborn and 
dead combine in the present as if they reflected each other in a mirror.　Through this 
combination, which Anderson (1998) cals “combined ghostliness” (p. 364), continuity of 
monochrome purity is ensured, and it affords a basis for the Goodness of nations.　The 
nation that retains a perfect purity as its basis cannot be wrong.
The unborn and the dead bring a sense of shame on the living in that the living do 
not achieve the same purity.　The way in which the living contribute to the Goodness of 
nations has to do with sexual representation.　According to Anderson (1998), athletic 
young male bodies are viewed as a representation of national soundness in many countri-
es, and mother is the only woman for whom young males do not feel sexual desire and in 
whom they put their trust unconditionaly.　This relationship might explain the relation-
ship between the nation and the state most clearly, because “It is She [Mother Country] 
who serves as the magnet around which a disorderly myriad of young…males form them-
selves into a beautifuly ordered field of force” (Anderson, 1998, p. 367).　The fraternity 
of the living framed by political incest taboo then works as the last source of the Good-
ness of nations.　In the above interview about a territorial issue, Abe might manifest his 
nationalism as the Prime Minister of Japan through this idea of the Goodness of nations.
The reason for the use of the Japanese language for national unification could be 
explained by using the notion of the Goodness of nations.　As noted above, the past of 
the Japanese language is represented as folows.
The Japanese language is formed through its long history, and it is the basis of our 
culture’s culture…　Our forefather’s emotions…are accumulated in each word of the 
Japanese language (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2004, p. 3 [translated by the author 
from the Japanese original]).
This representation overlooks the fact that the Japanese language as the national lan-
guage is a result of political manipulation to lessen disparities between spoken and writ-
ten languages between dialects (Yasuda, 2006).　It should be noted, furthermore, that 
the Japanese language was established by suppressing non-standard varieties for the pur-
pose of integrating the nation (Gotlieb, 2005).　In disregard of this political manipula-
tion, the Japanese language is represented as an innocent language as if it had not 
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experienced any chronological change.
The idea of the Goodness of nations applies to the representation of the future of the 
Japanese language.　Korekara no jidai ni motomerareru kokugoryoku ni tsuite 
(Concerning the Japanese Language Abilities Required for the Future Age) discusses two 
areas as the Japanese language abilities required for the future age.　One is the area that 
is needed to manage information centering around language, and the other area has to do 
with knowledge of the Japanese language, cultivation, a sense of value, and 
sensitivity.　The Japanese language as a basis for identity is then represented in the fol-
lowing way in terms of the second area.
This area forms a basis for ‘ability to think, ability to feel, ability to imagine, and abil-
ity to express’.　Furthermore, this area can be divided into the part of ‘knowledge of 
the Japanese language’, which is directly linked with ‘ability to think, ability to feel, 
ability to imagine, and ability to express’, and the part of ‘cultivation, a sense of value, 
and sensitivity’.
　　The later [cultivation, a sense of value, and sensitivity] is considered as a com-
ponent of the Japanese language proficiency, but more precisely speaking, the later 
itself is mainly shaped by the Japanese language proficiency, and plays a role as a 
basis for ‘ability to think, ability to feel, ability to imagine, and ability to 
express’.　Moreover, the later is the basis of al kinds of activities, and in this sense, 
it is the area that has a serious bearing on the fundamentals as a human being or a 
Japanese (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2004, p. 8 [translated by the author from the 
Japanese original]).
What characterizes this representation is that this report focuses only on psychological 
aspects of the Japanese language.　According to Morris-Suzuki (2002), one of the charac-
teristics in discourses of Japan’s nationalism is that they transform sociopolitical maters 
of Japanese society into psychological maters.　In other words, the problems that derive 
from social structure are atributed to psychology.　It is a good example that this report 
claims in a different part that the decay of morals, which has main source in social struc-
ture, could be treated by the education of feelings through the Japanese language.　As 
Anderson (1998) says with respect to the unborn, therefore, the Japanese language is 
stripped of al substantive sociological significance.
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It has been already noted that fraternity framed by political incest taboo guarantees 
the Goodness of nations (Anderson, 1998).　The folowing representation of the current 
Japanese language appears to imply that Japanese people have the relationship of ‘broth-
ers and sisters’ by learning the Japanese language as the ‘mother tongue’.
as internationalization progresses, the ability to think logicaly…, the need for the 
establishment of identity as a Japanese, and the importance of learning foreign lan-
guages…are passionately argued.　A command of the Japanese language as the 
mother tongue seriously affects al of these (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2004 
[translated by the author from the Japanese original]).
By abstracting social characteristics from the past and future of the Japanese language, 
the Japanese language is given monochrome purity, which guarantees the Goodness of 
the Japanese language.　It may further guarantee the Goodness of identity as the speak-
ers of the Japanese language.　The Japanese language as the ‘mother tongue’ then works 
as the magnet around which a disorderly myriad of Japanese people form a solid 
society.　The Goodness of the Japanese language may thus fit the state’s purpose to 
strengthen ties with others and enhance national unification.
Paradoxical Disintegration of Japanese Society
The ruling classes in Japan have taken active steps towards globalization on the one 
hand, but on the other, they have been driven by necessity to create social 
cohesion.　Kang and Morris (2002) compared the present state of Japanese society to 
stepping on the accelerator and the brake simultaneously, and say that such a situation 
inevitably gives rise to distortion.　I fear that the distortion manifests itself in the form of 
paradoxical disintegration of Japanese society.
The biggest cause of the paradoxical disintegration of Japanese society lies in the 
replacement of social maters by psychological maters.　Although Japanese-language dis-
courses stress love toward Japan, as long as loving is an art which is acquired (Fromm, 
1956), seeing love as a totaly psychological mater carries a problem with it.　According 
to Fromm (1956), the process of mastering an art is made up of being wel informed of 
theory and doing considerable practice.　Marrying theory with practice leads to master-
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ing an art.
Given that everyone does not have an equal access to knowledge (Giddens, 1990), 
however, different individuals have different degrees of mastery of the art of loving.　In 
Japan, as noted above, there is a correlation between disparities in income and 
education.　Those who have more economic and cultural capital have easier access to 
mastery of knowledge and the arts than those who have less capital (Bourdieu, 
1984).　Regional disparity may also affect the degree of mastery of the art of loving in 
that the center can offer more opportunities for access to knowledge than the 
periphery.　Replacing these social maters with psychological maters may trigger fur-
ther fragmentation of Japanese society.
Japanese-language discourses may segregate minorities from Japanese society. 
According to Bourdieu (1991), the legitimate competence of a language can be seen as lin-
guistic capital, which produces “a profit of distinction on the occasion of each social 
exchange” (p. 55).　In Japan, needless to say, the legitimate competence of the Japanese 
language functions as linguistic capital.　For many of minorities, however, the Japanese 
language is not the first language.　They lack linguistic capital, and this leads to the 
denial of equal opportunities in education, employment, and social security.　Even if they 
have bilingual ability, Japanese-language discourses, which exclusively focus on ‘Japanese-
ness’, eliminate the possibility of ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 1994).
As Selek (1997) suggests, while minorities only form a smal portion of the total 
population of Japan, they have a big influence on whether or not Japan can globalize 
itself.　Just as external and internal ethnic diversity are interrelated, so Japan needs to 
see its linguistic diversity as a global language system by going beyond exclusive nation-
alist movements.
Conclusion
As Bourdieu (1999) says, anxiety has been used as a way to control society in many 
countries.　Anxiety itself may be no more than a smal ripple on the surface of the 
mind.　As seen in Japanese society, however, the psychological ripple tends to search an 
object of assimilation for ontological security.　When the psychological ripple joins and is 
swalowed up by the state-led movement for re-structuring Japanese society, existing 
social inequity may be reproduced.　As demonstrated above, language can play a critical 
─　　─47
Studies in the Humanities and Sciences, Vol. LIII No. 2
role in the reproduction of social inequity.　Therefore, what is required for the study of 
the politics of language for the next decade in the twenty-first century is to unravel the 
mechanism by which language contributes to reproducing social inequity.
We can get an insight into a way to achieve the objective from two 
intelectuals.　Tolstoy (1900) saw nationalism and racism as two sides of the same coin, 
and denied the existence of sound nationalism.　He thus claimed that the only justifiable 
love is love for the human race.
As Tolstoy suggests, the denial of nationalism itself is one of the ways to achieve 
social equality.　Yet given that nationalism could be seen as a psychological tie with a par-
ticular space which individuals construct through their social practices (Morris-Suzuki, 
2007), it is not easy to totaly deny nationalism.　Citing a passage from Hugo of St. 
Victor’s Didascalicon, Said (1994) gives a suggestion as to this point.
“ The man who finds its homeland sweet it stil a tender beginner; he to whom every 
soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world 
is as a foreign land.” The more one is able to leave one’s cultural home, the more eas-
ily is one able to judge it, and the whole world as wel, with the spiritual detachment 
and generosity necessary for true vision.　The more easily, too, does one assesses 
oneself and alien cultures with the same combination of intimacy and distance (p. 
259).
I interpret this statement as geting a critical perspective toward our own homeland.　We 
should cast a critical eye on, deconstruct, and relativeze our cultural, ethnic, and political 
home.　The critical eye makes it possible for us to conduct a close inspection of the 
native country from every angle.　We can then get an overal picture of the state, keeping 
a certain distance from it.　This may lead to unraveling the mechanism in which lan-
guage is involved in the reproduction of social inequality and enforcing beter language 
policies.
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